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Description: A bibliography created for Professor Nancy Johnson's Advanced
Legal Research Course.





Interest Groups, Associations, and Misc. Materials
Home
Scope
This guide provides an overview of defensive maneuvers to hostile takeovers. This guide consists of cases, secondary materials and relevant




Bibliographies on this Web site were prepared for educational purposes by law students as part of Nancy P. Johnson's Advanced Legal Research
course. The Law Library does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information provided. Thorough legal research
requires a researcher to update materials from date of publication; please note the semester and year the bibliography was prepared.
Overview
This research guide attempts to guide the researcher on the path of legally fending off unwanted corporate takeovers. While most corporate
takeovers are friendly, publicly held corporations can be taken over when the buyer directly makes an offer to the shareholders over the objection
of corporate management. Normally, once the buyer has over 50% of the shares, he has the right to control the company. There are 3 ways in
which a suitor can directly entice shareholders to hand over their shares:
Tender Offers- A tender offer is an offer to buy the shares of a target company. Often, the offer is subject to the buyer receiving a minimum or
maximum amount of shares from the sole seller or a group of sellers. This is to ensure that a certain number of shares are sold so that the buyer has
adequate control of the company.
Proxy contests- “The most expensive, the most uncertain, and the least used of the various techniques”.- Mergers and Acquisitions 2nd Ed.
Stephen M. Bainbridge Foundation press 2009. A proxy is an assignment of the right to vote. A shareholder can assign this right vote to any person
they wish. However, a proxy is not a vote itself. It is simply authorization for someone to vote on your behalf. In a proxy contest, the suitor will
gain control but not ownership, as this is merely a chance to vote for a slate of directors. 
Combined proxy contest and tender offers- The suitor can solicit proxies with a promise of a tender offer to follow in the event that they
succeed in their vote.
A board can defend itself from a hostile takeover. While in many instances, a board must allow a takeover to take place, there are certain defenses
and defense mechanisms that can be used. This guide will serve as an exploration of these defense mechanisms.
Corporate managers have certain duties to their shareholders. They must act in the best interest of the corporation and not their own personal
interests. Because any defense to a takeover usually involve management keeping their respective positions, the courts have struggled to balance
these competing interests.
Hostile Takeover Defenses in the Face of the Business Judgment Rule - LibGuides at Georgia State University College of Law
file:///I|/...eborah%20-%20Fall%202012/LibGuide%20Backups/hostile_takeover_defenses_in_the_face_of_the_business_judgment_rule_162619_1353173772.html[11/17/2012 1:06:46 PM]
Takeover Defenses
 Crown Jewel Sale- Defense where target company has particular line of business that the acquirer wants.  To prevent the takeover, the target
company simply disposes of the sought after line.
White Knight-The target company finds a buyer on their own. One that will run the company in a manner agreed to by management.
Pac Man-The Target corporation will attempt to buy the suitor.
Golden Parachutes- Management inserts a clause allowing for extremely large severance payments that the target company agrees to pay senior
management in event of a takeover.
 Poison Pill- This is a common takeover defense mechanism that makes the target unattractive to attain by inserting a clause which is activated
when a takeover begins to occur.
 Stand-Still Agreements- An agreement between target and suitor that the buyer will not continue to acquire shares to give time to target and
provide for negotiation.
No-Shop Provision- Target agrees that they will not attempt to deal with another suitor in exchange for a favorable agreement of some sort.
Lock-Up Agreement- An agreement to sell a particular asset to a white-knight to keep it out of reach of the corporate suiter.
About the Author
Haniyah Miller is currently a third-year law student, graduating in the class of 2011. She focuses on business law. She is currently an intern to the
CEO of Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority and the Editor-in-Chief of the Southern Region Black Law Student Association Law




The Securities Exchange Commission regulates tender offers, which is the primary way that a company is taken over. Thus, in order to understand
Merger and Acquisitions and takeover defenses, one must be familiar with securities regulation. The following are acts that affect disclosure of
tender offers.
Securities Act of 1933, 14 U.S.C.S. § 77(a) (1933).
In an effort to prevent another crash, this act was enacted after the stock market crash of 1929. The two primary goals of the act are 1) mandating
disclosure of material info to investors and 2) preventing fraud. The act requires certain disclosures when the sale of securities is at issue. Because
tender offers involve securities, they are governed by this act.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 14 U.S.C.S. § 78(a) (1934).
The first amendment to the act of 1933. This extended the act to cover secondary markets, while allowing for certain extensions. This act called for
disclosure statements to be filed regularly and kept on file with the Securities Exchange Commission.
Willams Act of 1968, 14 U.S.C.S. § 78(a) (1968).
One of the most important amendments to the act of 1934 because it requires any person who makes an offeror a cash-tender offer to purchase the
stock of a corporation that is required to be registered under federal law, to disclose the following: the source of the funds used in the offer, the
purpose for which the offer is made, the plans the purchaser might have if successful, and any contracts or understandings concerning the target




This set of Federal Regulations govern Securities and exchanges.
23 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 54:190. Anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions—Standing of target of corporate takeover.
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      While the prevailing rule appears to be that the target of a corporate takeover has no standing to bring antitrust claims against the tender offeror,
Second Circuit law grants standing to the target of a hostile takeover on the basis that an alleged loss of the ability to compete independently
constitutes antitrust injury, even if the target alleges only a loss of potential competition.
Cases
The Following cases are key to the development of takeover defenses. Please note that Delaware is home to many corporations and much business
law has originated in their courts. Other states often look to Delaware law when making decisions. Note: because each of the following cases
builds upon the other, they are listed in reverse chronological order.
Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
Maremount proposed a merger between itself and Holland Furnace. Maremount was a rival company, which had a reputation for buying companies
and then liquidating them for profit. They began buying shares from Holland Furnace. After Holland refused to sell, they began buying back the
company stock on the market.  Eventually, the board of Holland decides to repurchase its own shares from Maremount at a price significantly
higher than the prevailing market price. Minority shareholders brought a derivative action. The court held that if a company reasonably believes that
buying out a stockholder is necessary to run an effective business, then the board will not be liable, even if the outcome is bad.
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
This is perhaps one of the most important cases in corporate law because it is the case that established the business judgment rule.  This rule
presumes that, when directors make business decisions on an informed basis and in good faith, they are acting in the best interest of the company
and a court will presume that their decisions are valid.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
Mesa owned thirteen percent of Unocal stock. They made a hostile tender offer to purchase enough stock to become the majority owner. Unocal’s
board decided to use company funds to purchase its own shares to prevent Mesa’s control. Thus, they rejected Mesa’s offer and proceeded to
purchase their own shares. Mesa challenged this arguing that Unocal breached a fiduciary duty it owed to its shareholders. The court held that
Unocal’s actions were protected by the business judgment rule as the decision had a rational purpose.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,  (506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
A suitor attempting to purchase Revlon brought suit in this action. Another company attempted to bid for Revlon as well, thus the sale of Revlon
was unavoidable. Revlon approved a leverage buyout whereby the company would be broken up. The court held that although Delaware law
permits agreements and takeover defenses, the defenses may not cause a breach of the fiduciary duty owed to shareholders.  Once a sale appears
inevitable, the target must shift from being defensive to seeking to maximize the company’s value to ensure the highest price.
Paramount Communications, Inc.  v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
Time was in negotiations with Warner for a stock for stock purchase. Paramount decided to offer Time a large amount for its stock, in fact larger
than that of Warner’s offer. Time refused Paramount’s offer and Paramount filed suit. The court held that if a board is pursuing a merger for
strategic reasons and a higher offer is made, the board has the right to decline the higher offer.  Time felt that the merger would yield a higher long
term return whereas the purchase by Paramount would yield only a short term gain and not retain the company culture, the court agreed.
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
Paramount entered merger talks with Viacom to thwart an unsolicited tender offer by QVC to buy Paramount. Paramount approved a merger that
would turn Paramount stock into Viacom stock and exempted the merger from its poison pills put into place. The two agreed to a no shop clause
preventing Paramount from negotiating with any other prospective buyers. Pricing wars continued for the 2 competing suitors. QVC brought
sought. The court held that a board selling its company has a duty to obtain the best price for its shareholders and cannot give preference to one
bidder over another. 
Broz. v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996).
The court held that a fiduciary must place the corporation interest before his own interest.
In re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
This court reiterated a long standing presumption that “a majority stockholder owes a duty to permit the independent directors on the target board
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All definitions located in: Black's Law Dictionary, (9th ed. 2009), located at www.westlaw.com
 
Takeover- The acquisition of ownership or control of a corporation.
Friendly takeover- A takeover that is approved by the target corporation.
Hostile takeover- A takeover that is resisted by the target corporation.
Acquisition- The gaining of possession or control over something <acquisition of the target company's assets.
Antitakeover measure- A provision in a company's organizational documents intended to discourage unwanted takeover bids by setting forth the
actions the company may take, as a target, to avoid an involuntary  takeover.
Freezout- A transaction in which a shareholder or group of shareholders obtains the entire common-equity interest in a company while the other
shareholders receive cash, debt, or preferred stock in exchange for their common-equity shares.
Stock- The capital or principal fund raised by a corporation through subscribers' contributions or the sale of shares.
Merger- The act or an instance of combining or uniting.
Bust-up merger- A merger in which the acquiring corporation sells off lines of business owned by the target corporation to repay the loans used in
the acquisition.
cash merger. A merger in which shareholders of the target company must accept cash for their shares.
DeFacto merger- A transaction that has the economic effect of a statutory merger but that is cast in the form of an acquisition or sale of assets or
voting stock.
Horizontal merger- A merger between two or more businesses that are on the same market level because they manufacture similar products in the
same geographic region; a merger of direct competitors.
Reverse triangular merger- A merger in which the acquiring corporation's subsidiary is absorbed into the target corporation, which becomes a
new subsidiary of the acquiring corporation.
Triangular merger- A merger in which the target corporation is absorbed into the acquiring corporation's subsidiary, with the target's shareholders
receiving stock in the parent corporation. 
Legal Forms
      6A. Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Corporations §§ 74:1361- 74:1378.
      6A. Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Corporations §§ 74:2261- 74:228.
      7A. Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Corporations, Forms 318, 319, 324, 335, 401-425.
Law Review Articles
Because of the big boom of hostile takeovers in the 80's many scholarly articles were written in that time period. While they may be dated, they are
still applicable. These early articles explored the early ethical conflicts of fiduciary duties.
Mark Gordon, Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 55 STAN. L. REV 819 (2010).
Many have debated the effectiveness of takeover defenses to thwart hostile takeovers. Gordon not only argues that they work, but he also dives into
the implications of their effectiveness on fiduciary duties.
 
John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 287-88
(2000). 
This article critiques and deciphers scientific studies that prove and disprove the effectivness of poison pill plans.
 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence,
and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002).
Staggered boards are a poison pill defense. When a board's terms are staggered, it is difficult to replace them, thereby gaining the majority vote.
This note focuses on this specific defense tactic.
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Martin M. Cohen, Poison Pills as a Negotiating Tool: Seeking a Cease-Fire in the Corporate Takeover Wars, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 459
(1987).
This note focuses on one type of defense, poison pills. The author focuses on how poison pills can not only be used to thwart takeovers, but how
they can be used to leverage a non-hostile takeover or one that is inevitable.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1161 (1981).
This note explores the fiduciary duty that a board owes to its shareholders. The duty that a board has once a "Revlon moment" has arisen is often in
conflict with the boards self interest to protect their reign. This note explores these conflicts.
Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).
This note provides a look at the negative affects of takeover defenses and why they should not be allowed.
Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 130 (1979).
 This note explores the boards duties once bidding wars have begun.
 
Books
The following books offer incite into how hostile takeovers are performed and defensive measures and their effectiveness.
Dethroning the King: The Hostile Takeover of Anheuser-Busch, an American Icon by by Julie MacIntosh
ISBN: 0470592702How one of America's most beloved corporations was taken over by a foreign conglomerate.
Pack Your Own Parachute: How to Survive Mergers, Takeovers, and Other Corporate Disasters by Paul Hirsch
ISBN: 0201122057This book explores defense mechanisms in depth and their usefulness in the event of a hostile takeover.
Takeover Defense, Mergers and Acquisitions by Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Alexander R. Sussman
Call Number: Call Number: Online Resource (WLX Treatises) PubDate: 2007
ISBN: 0735594147This is the Mergers and Acquisitions Attorney's handbook. Everything you'd want or need to know about Mergers is in this set.
Resisting Hostile Takeovers: The Case of Gillette by Jr., Arthur Fleischer, Alexander R. Sussman
ISBN: 0275958302This book explores the defense measures Gillette Inc. took to resist a hostile takeover.
Knights, Raiders, and Targets: The Impact of the Hostile Takeover by John C. Coffee (Editor), Louis Lowenstein (Editor), Susan Rose-Ackerman (Editor)
Call Number: Call Number: HD2746.5 .K58 1987 PubDate: 1987
ISBN: 0195044045Once a takeover becomes inevitable, how will a company be affected? This book seeks to answer this question.
Gods at War: Shotgun Takeovers, Government by Deal, and the Private Equity Implosion by Steven M. David
Call Number: Call Number: HG4028.M4 D38 2009 PubDate: 2009
ISBN: 0470431296Analyzes the legal issues, the politics, and the players in high–profile merger and acquisition transactions.
Securities regulation : hostile corporate takeovers, synopses of thirty-two attempts : fact sheet for the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives by Washington, D.C., The Office
Call Number: Call Number: GA 1.13:GGD-88-48 FS PubDate: 1988 Located: Library North 1, Government Document Micro
Encyclopedia and Dictionaries
69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities Regulation- Federal § 60 (2010).
18A Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1 (2010).
 
18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations, Extent of judicial intervention—Circumstances requiring enhanced judicial scrutiny; defensive measures § 1477
(2010).
Donnan Mandell , THE DEALMAKER'S DICTIONARY OF MERGER AND ACQUISITION TERMINOLOGY (Business Publications)  (1985). 
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Treatises
Timothy J. Galpin, Mark Herndon, The Complete Guide to Mergers and Acquisitions : Process Tools to Support M&A Integration at
Every Level (Jossey-Bass Publishers 2000).
This treatises focuses on mergers and acquisitions and how they can be smoothly effectuated.
Cases in Corporate Acquisitions, Buyouts, Mergers, & Takeovers. (Gale Group 1999).
A collection of case studies on "high profile" corporate acquisitions, buyouts, mergers, and takeovers from 1868 to early 2000. 
Donald Wolfe, Jr. and Michael Pittenger, Wolfe and Pittenger on Revlon, Inc. and New Standard of Judicial Review, 2008 Emerging issues
1934 (2008).
The authors conclude that Revlon has establised a new standard of review. The standard of review is no longer reviewed according to the business
judgment rule, but will be scrutinized for reasonableness in relation to the obligation and fiduciary responsibility to maximize the price.
American Law Reports
Lockup Option Defense to Hostile Corporate Takeover, 66 A.L.R.4th 180 (1988).
This annotation collects and discusses the state and federal cases in which the courts have considered the propriety of the use of the "lockup
option" as a defense to a hostile or unfriendly, unsolicited corporate takeover, whereby the targeted corporation grants one potential suitor an
option to purchase treasury or unissued corporate shares or a major asset of the corporation.
Construction and Application of State Antitakeover Statutes, 37 A.L.R.6th 1 (2008).
This annotation collects and analyzes the cases in which courts have considered and determined issues relating to the construction and application
of state antitakeover statutes.
 
Duty of Corporate Directors to Exercise "informed" Judgment in Recommending Responses to Merger or Tender Offers, 46 A.L.R.4th
887 (1986).
 
This annotation collects and analyzes the state and federal cases which discuss the duty of corporate directors, under state law, to exercise informed




Interest Groups, Associations, and Misc. Materials
Government Agencies
Federal Trade Commission. Bureau of Competition. Mergers & Acquisitions
  http://www.ftc.gov/bc/mergers.shtm
 






EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml
Performs automated collection, validation, indexing, acceptance, and forwarding of submissions by companies and others who are required by law
to file forms with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interest Groups
Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRC)
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A leading funder of research on corporate responsibility and investing. This organization funds objective research focused on corporate governance
and responsibility.The research is broadly available to investors, policymakers, and interested stakeholders to help foster informed, fact-based
decisions.
Ellen Terrell, Library of Congress, Business Reference Section, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND JOINT VENTURES (2003),
http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/mergers/mergers.html
The Library of Congress has collected resources that aid in research or mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures.
The Widener Insititute of Delaware Corporate and Business Law http://blogs.law.widener.edu/delcorp/ This website is dedicated to Delaware
corporate law and covers cases and studies. They also publish the Delaware Journal of Corporate Law.
Lionsgate v. Carl Icahn
 Lionsgate Vice President discusses a current takeover attempt by Carl Ichan, a well known corporate raider. In this clip we see his unwillingness
to be taken-over and how he feels his shareholders will vote. He also discusses the impact of the offer on stock prices of this media corporation.
Mintz Levin- Takeover Preparation
Mintz Levin is a well known financial advisor and attorney. In this clip, he discusses how a company can prepare for an inevitible hostile bid.
Inside The Deal: Mintz Levin's Gulotta on Takeover Bid Prepar... - Watch the best video clips here
Bar Association
The American Bar Association, business section has drafted the Model Code Business Act. The act is a model set of laws that 24 states has
adopted that seeks to bring consistency to the field of corporate law.  The official text can be found at
www.abanet.org/buslaw/library/onlinepublications/mbca2002.pdf
The ABA business law section lobbys for changes in business law. They also host various conferences and courses to assist business lawyers.
Blogs and Websites




This blog attempts to keep you up to date with the legal area of Mergers.
CNN Money
http://money.cnn.com/news/deals/mergers/biggest.html
CNN Money has blogs on various topics dealing with finances and corporations.
Merger Network
http://www.mergernetwork.com/
This website lists businesses for sale or those seeking mergers or "white knights".
American Bar Association Business Section
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/
The American Bar Association business section is instrumental in forging business law throughout the country.
Key Delaware Key Summaries
http://www.delawarebusinesslitigation.com/articles/case-summaries/
This website is owned by a corporate firm. They discuss and analyze key cases in corporate law from Delaware courts.
The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/welcome/
The website states: "The Forum provides updates on working papers, seminars, speakers, and other activities sponsored by the Program. The Forum also features
communications about corporate governance and financial regulation by individuals associated with the Program — faculty, fellows, and members of the Program’s advisory
board — as well as by guest contributors and others."
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